Abstract:
The vast majority of health plans in the United States require patients to meet cost-sharing requirements that are unrelated to income. Because this is highly inequitable, the authors propose a new system in which cost sharing is explicitly linked to income levels. This proposal differs from earlier proposals to relate cost sharing to income, which relied on the federal income tax system. In this plan, employers and insurers (both public and private) would collect the information necessary to relate cost sharing amounts to income The proposal could he applied to nearly any health system reform proposal currently under discussion. The authors examine the experience of a number of U.S. firms that have already incorporated income-related cost sharing, as possible models to apply to health insurance nationwide. N early all fee-for-service health insurance plans in the United States require that patients share in the payment of their health care expenses through deductibles and coinsurance. In the vast majority of cases, these assessments are "flat;" that is, everyone pays the same amount, irrespective of their income. In this paper we propose that both private and public health insurance plans in the United States be modified to include a provision that explicitly relates these patient cost-sharing requirements to people's ability to pay.
Briefly, the system we put forth would work in the following way. When a service is received, a patient would share costs based on his or her wage level. At the end of the year, the income tax system would be used to correct for any discrepancies between the individual's wages and family income. The poor and those without jobs would pay no cost sharing at the time services are received.
Because cost-sharing requirements are usually unrelated to ability to pay, they can be very regressive. In employer-sponsored plans, deductibles average about $200 for individual coverage and $400 for family coverage; coinsurance rates paid by the patient are usually 20 percent of covered charges; and annual maximum patient liabilities vary by firm, typically ranging from $500 to $2,000 a year. Cost sharing under the Medicare program is also unrelated to ability to pay. 1 Under Part A (hospital insurance) there is a fixed inpatient deductible ($652 in 1992) and substantial daily coinsurance for stays in excess of sixty days. Under Part B (supplementary medical insurance) there is a $100 annual deductible and 20 percent coinsurance.
These cost-sharing requirements are inequitable. 2 Individuals and families with lower incomes who do seek medical care will spend a greater proportion of their income just to meet the cost-sharing requirements. This can be seen in an examination of wage levels for different workers, industries, and demographic groups. The average wage of persons working in managerial and professional positions, for example, is more than twice that of persons working in service-related jobs. Communication workers earn almost three times as much as those in agricultural sectors. Black families INCOME-RELATED COST SHARING 23 are almost three times as likely as white families to have incomes less than $15,000.
3 These differences are much greater, of course, when one considers averages by differences between a firm's top executives and its lowest-paid employees.
This problem is exacerbated when health status is considered. In 1990, for example, 19 percent of persons with incomes less than $14,000 rated their health as "fair" or "poor," compared with 5 percent or less among those with incomes above $35,000. 4 A related problem is that cost sharing appears to have a disproportionate effect on the health of lower-income persons, according to various findings from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. 5 What can be done about the inequities that arise from cost-sharing requirements? Besides the obvious option of doing nothing, two other possibilities arise. One is to eliminate cost-sharing requirements from health insurance plans; the other is to base cost sharing on income levels, so that lower-income individuals pay less.
The first option-eliminating cost sharing-is problematic. It would result in increased service use (for possibly unnecessary services) and would drive health care costs still higher. Furthermore, such a strategy runs counter to current trends in the fee-for-service sector, which show that cost sharing is more and more common in health insurance plans. Of people with employer-sponsored coverage in 1987, 95 percent had policies with a deductible, compared with 85 percent in 1977. Similarly, 91 percent had health insurance policies in 1987 with coinsurance levels of 20 percent or more, up from 81 percent in 1977. 6 The second option-basing cost-sharing requirements on ability to pay-is attractive because it places the deterrent effect of cost sharing more in line with what each family is able to afford. It thus might serve to strengthen the incentive among low-income persons to seek necessary and effective care in a timely manner. It would also appear to be more politically promising. Some national health care reform proposals have explicitly incorporated provisions for income-related cost sharing in their insurance arrangements. In the Pepper Commission proposal, for example, individuals would not have to pay cost sharing if they were below the poverty level, while those with incomes between 100 percent and 200 percent of poverty would pay only partial cost-sharing amounts, based on a sliding scale. 7 The HealthAmerica bill (S. 1227) proposed by the Senate Democratic health leadership during 1991 explicitly allows for (but does not require) incomerelated cost sharing. It stipulates that if income-related cost sharing is employed, deductibles should not exceed 1 percent of wages for an individual (2 percent for a family), and annual out-of-pocket maximum liabilities for a family should not exceed 10 percent of wages.
Perhaps more importantly, a number of employers in the United States have already adopted income-related cost sharing into their health insurance plans. It is useful to closely examine such plans, as they may offer other useful lessons on how to make the medical care system more equitable without aggravating cost increases.
Income-Related Cost Sharing In Health Insurance: Some Examples
Prevalence. Although it is clearly not the norm, there are many examples of income-related cost sharing in the U.S. private health insurance market. 8 The most comprehensive data source showing the frequency of such plans is an annual survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 9 Approximately 2,000 firms with 100 or more employees are surveyed, representing 32.4 million full-time employees in the nonagricultural sector. One of the questions included in the survey is designed to elicit whether deductibles in health insurance plans are tied to wages. Based on the BLS data, we found that 2.7 percent of full-time employees and dependents who participate in their firm's health care plan have their plan deductible based on their earnings. 10 In contrast, 93.5 percent have a fixed-dollar deductible, and 3.7 percent have no deductible. (Although the 2.7 percent figure for medium and large firms may seem low, other BLS data indicate that less than one-half of 1 percent of employees in small firms have wage-related deductibles.) 11 Exhibit 1 examines how the presence of wagerelated deductibles varies by firm characteristics.
Nevertheless, although we believe there may be a trend toward the adoption of income-related cost sharing among U.S. firms, it is still relatively uncommon. Why has it not caught on? Unfortunately, there are no data available that shed any light on this issue, so we can only speculate. We see three likely reasons.
First, there has been no model of income-related cost sharing available from which firms could draw. Although the concept has been discussed sporadically in the academic literature, this information is not readily available to employee benefit managers. Furthermore, as discussed below, most previous proposals centered on revising the income tax system, not on employer health plans. Given the lack of a model, it is somewhat remarkable that so many firms have, largely on their own, devised their own systems of linking cost-sharing requirements to wages.
A second, related reason concerns administrative costs. Employers might believe that even if such a system were desirable, it would entail administrative costs that are far too high. As we discuss below, this does not appear to be the case, at least among the ten firms that we interviewed. Perhaps the belief stems from a time when payment of health insurance claims was less INCOME-RELATED COST SHARING 25 automated than it is today. Finally, one possible reason that firms have not moved toward incomerelated cost sharing concerns the politics of employee benefits. The group with the strongest interest in such a change would be persons with the lowest incomes-the same group that is least likely to wield much political influence in a firm. In contrast, firms' decisionmakers, who have the highest incomes, would have the most to lose personally from the implementation of such a system. Specific company policies. To learn more about the specifics of health insurance plans that link cost sharing to wages, we searched for companies that have adopted this type of plan. We contacted experts from the aca- demic community, benefits consulting firms, and government. Our sample, which is in no way meant to be representative, is composed of the first ten successful leads. We spoke with the employee benefit manager in each of these firms to obtain the necessary details about the plans. We queried them about the details of how wages and cost sharing were linked, any administrative problems they had encountered, and why such a plan was adopted in the first place.
In general, we found that none of the plans linked coinsurance rates to wages. Those we interviewed indicated that this would be more confusing to employees and that it was sufficient to link only the deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums to wage levels. The firms also indicated that they experienced little additional administrative burden in relating cost sharing to wages; once the systems were in place for a few months they posed few difficulties. Finally, the plans we queried indicated that they had adopted the system largely for equity reasons. The only other reason cited was that other firms in the industry were beginning to do it.
The ten employer health plans we contacted can be grouped into four categories with respect to how cost-sharing requirements are linked to wages. The most common arrangement appears to be flexible benefit plans in which both deductibles and maximums are linked to wages. Exhibit 2 shows examples of how two of these five firms structured their cost-sharing requirements. In both, employees can choose between alternative health plans that differ with respect to the magnitude of cost-sharing requirements. Employees who choose plans with lower cost-sharing requirements pay higher premiums to account for the resulting higher utilization rates.
Exhibit 2 Flexible Benefit Plans With Deductibles And Out-Of-Pocket Maximums Based On Wages, Examples From Two Firms
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The two firms shown differ in one important way: Employer B sets fairly narrow ranges into which both deductibles and annual maximums must fall, whereas Employer A does not. Consequently, Employer A has a much stronger linkage between wages and cost sharing.
In each of the remaining cost-sharing arrangements, there was a standard benefit package (that is, flexible benefits such as those shown in Exhibit 2 were not employed). Exhibits 3-5 array these arrangements. All of these firms used discrete bands to determine which employees fell within which category. This contrasts sharply with the firms shown in Exhibit 2, where there could be different cost-sharing requirements for each employee.
These exhibits are significant because they show that many firms have already determined that there is a need to base cost sharing on wage levels and have developed ways to implement such a system. If such a system is to be truly fair, however, we must develop a method to adjust these costsharing requirements to a family's total income, not just the employee's wages. As we illustrate below, most analysts have concluded that this can only be accomplished through the income tax system.
Previous Proposals For Income-Related Cost Sharing
The idea of relating patient cost-sharing requirements to income is not new. Such a proposal was developed by Martin Feldstein as far back as 1971. 13 For illustrative purposes we present two other proposals for incorpo- rating income-related cost sharing into a national health care system because they have more in common with our recommended design. One of these was proposed for the United States by Laurence Seidman, and the other for Ontario by a Canadian commission. 14 (We point out that Seidman now advocates a more radical departure from our present systemmajor-risk national health insurance-which, among other things, removes the link between employment and health insurance coverage. 15 We focus on his previous article because it provides valuable guidance for our system of income-related cost sharing.)
Seidman's 1980 proposal. Unlike the system we suggest, Seidman's proposal relies entirely on the federal income tax system to link income with cost sharing; health insurance policies would not have different costsharing requirements for people with different income levels. 16 However, at the end of the year, people would file for tax credits based on their out-ofpocket medical expenditures, and the size of these credits would be determined by their income.
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People without health insurance would continue to pay all of their medical care expenses, as they do now, but with the help of loans (which could be instantaneously issued through the use of a medical credit card). 
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At the end of the year, they would file for an income tax credit. In Seidman's hypothetical example, the size of the credit would be equal to 80 percent of expenses above a $1,000 deductible, plus 100 percent of expenses after out-of-pocket costs exceed 10 percent of income. People with private insurance would be eligible to file for a credit only if their out-ofpocket expenses exceeded those of persons without private insurance. One advantage of Seidman's proposal is that it provides a great deal of flexibility to the federal government concerning how it exactly would like to relate cost sharing to income. If government wanted to set the out-ofpocket maximum at 5 percent of income for the near-poor and at 10 percent for others, it could do so simply by using a somewhat more complicated tax credit formula than the one used above. A second advantage is that all income-not just labor income-could be considered in computing the credit. This means that dual-income families and those with other sources of income would not be able to circumvent the intent of the system.
There are some disadvantages, however. Two of the biggest ones are that the system might be difficult for people to understand and could involve a great deal of paperwork. As Joseph Newhouse points out in his critique of Seidman's article, it may be unrealistic to expect that most low-income people will understand their need to file a tax credit if they have no income tax due. 18 More problematic may be the amount of record keeping necessary. Anyone wishing to file a tax credit would need to know (and presumably, provide documentation of) all medical expenditures during the previous year and be able to distinguish between covered and uncovered expenses as well.
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Another problem concerns the extent to which cost sharing will deter use of health services under the proposal. Individuals who file for a loan by paying through their medical credit cards may act as though there is no cost sharing, since they will not have to pay anything until their loan is due. In contrast, people who do not apply for a loan will pay 100 percent of costs at the time they receive a service, receiving a credit only after they file their tax return the next year. They may therefore underuse services. Although there is no research to indicate exactly how people would behave under a delayed cost-sharing scheme, it is possible that they would act very differently than if cost sharing were applied when the service is provided.
The Ontario proposal. A proposal to incorporate income-related cost sharing into Ontario's health care system, made in a report by the Ontario Economic Council, was never implemented; cost sharing is not required in any of Canada's provinces for hospital and physician services. 20 On the surface, the Ontario proposal appears to be the converse of Seidman's. Instead of making the patient pay up front and providing a tax credit later on, it proposes that the province pay for costs initially and then In essence, the two proposals are very similar; both rely entirely on the tax system to relate cost-sharing requirements to income. Neither proposal has different cost-sharing requirements, based on income, at the time services are received. In contrast, what we propose is to build incomerelated cost sharing into the benefit structure of health insurance plans, just as the ten companies described earlier have done. The tax system would be used only to make any corrections, at the end of the year, that are necessary to ensure equity. We argue that such a system would be considerably simpler to operate and understand and would retain the current deterrent effect of cost sharing. It would require, however, the standardization of health insurance benefits across firms.
How To Incorporate Income-Related Cost Sharing Into Health Plans
Here we develop an approach for incorporating income-related cost sharing into both private and public health insurance plans. By presenting INCOME-RELATED COST SHARING 3 1 the idea generically rather than attaching it to a single health care reform plan, we show how income-related cost sharing could fit into almost any health care reform package, whether it relies primarily on the private sector, expands Medicare to the entire population, or adopts a mixed private/ public model. Private health insurance. In the private health insurance sector, everyone above the poverty level would be subject to the same cost-sharing requirements. Although it is not clear exactly what rates would be required to keep the system expenditure-neutral, for illustrative purposes we use the percentages included in the HealthAmerica proposal, described above: (1) Individuals face an annual deductible of 1 percent of wages (2 percent for families); (2) everyone pays 20 percent coinsurance on covered charges; and (3) individuals face an annual out-of-pocket maximum of 5 percent of wages (10 percent for families).
Employees would submit their health insurance claims to their employer's health care plan. The plan would compute each employee's costsharing requirements for a particular medical claim based on formulas such as those shown above. It would then pay the provider its share and inform the employee (and the provider) of the remainder to be paid by the employee out of pocket. 21 This sort of a system is not very complicated administratively, and, in fact, the companies we spoke with that use such a system reported no particular administrative difficulties in carrying it out. The primary complication that arises stems from the fact that an employee's wages may not constitute his or her entire income. It is this complication that led previous researchers to conclude that all cost-sharing adjustments should be made through the income tax system.
What we propose instead is that the income tax system be used to make up for any inequities (be they underpayments or overpayments) that arise. 22 This would be accomplished by having each employer submit to all employees, along with their W-2 forms, a statement listing total covered medical expenditures and total out-of-pocket liabilities. (This obviates the need for detailed medical record keeping on the part of the patient.) The income tax form could then be designed to compare actual out-of-pocket costs with the amount that is consistent with the employee's or family's total income; any shortfalls in actual payments would be added to income tax due, while overpayments would represent a credit.
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Public health insurance. Public health insurance plans would operate in a similar fashion; the main difference would be that an individual's income may be hard to determine at the time a medical care service is used. To deal with this problem, it is useful to consider the groups that could be insured by the public sector: employees who do not receive insurance The first group-employees whose employers do not provide health insurance-is only relevant if there is a universal health insurance system. Under most reform proposals, they would be covered by the public sector. 24 Including them in an income-related cost-sharing system would be straightforward because their employment income would be known. Each firm with employees in the public plan would submit wage information to the public plan administrator. Cost-sharing requirements would be the same as in the private insurance sector. This is equitable because these persons should be treated no differently than employees whose employers had opted to provide their own insurance coverage.
The second group-those eligible for welfare-also could be dealt with in a straightforward manner. They would not be responsible for paying any cost sharing. In fact, it might be desirable to define as "categorically eligible" any family with income below the poverty level, since almost all proposals for universal coverage specifically exempt them from cost sharing.
The third group-the unemployed not eligible for welfare-is different because its members, although not in the labor force, might have other sources of income and therefore be able to afford cost sharing. Since these people's incomes would not be known, one possibility would be to exempt them from cost sharing when they receive services but have them pay any amount owed when they file their income tax returns. This is also attractive because they would not face cost-sharing requirements during a period in which they may not have any income. 25 The situation for the self-employed is more complicated. Many selfemployed persons can afford to pay cost sharing, so they should not be exempted until the time they file their annual tax returns. One possibility would be for them to complete another form when they file their quarterly interim payments to the Internal Revenue Service. The form could be constructed so that cost-sharing payments are equal to what they would have been if income had been earned as an employee. However, this might weaken the deterrent effect of cost sharing. An alternative possibility would be to base cost-sharing requirements on the person's annual income during the previous year and allow them the opportunity to file for quarterly adjustments if their current income is lower than it was before.
Incorporating Medicare into the system would entail a number of changes in the program's structure. The first necessary change would be to merge Medicare Parts A and B. Currently, each has its own cost-sharing requirements; income-related cost sharing becomes very cumbersome if there is not a single set of requirements. 26 Second, Medicare would have to establish a catastrophic cap (that is, an out-of-pocket maximum). Finally, a method would need to be developed to determine a beneficiary's income. 27 
Related Issues
Mandated cost-sharing requirements. Why should all employer health insurance plans be required to contain the same cost-sharing requirements? Shouldn't employers and employees be left free to devise the plan that best meets their needs? There are two reasons that it may be worthwhile to mandate specific income-related cost-sharing requirements. First is the issue of fairness. Compared with the current situation, mandated incomerelated cost sharing will enhance both vertical and horizontal equity. 28 Vertical equity will improve almost by definition. If cost-sharing requirements are defined as a percentage of income, people with lower incomes will, in the event of illness, pay less for care than those who are better off. Horizontal equity will also be improved. Obviously, under the current system, people who work for firms that offer health insurance face lower cost-sharing requirements than those who are uninsured. But perhaps equally important is that some firms' plans are much more generous than others. While 15-20 percent of employees in medium and large firms have plans with out-of-pocket maximums of less than $500 annually, an equal number face maximums that are four times as great. 29 Standardizing benefits would be a way to make health insurance plans more equitable across the insured population.
Aside from the issue of equity, a second reason to adopt uniform costsharing requirements is for the sake of simplicity-to enhance people's understanding of their health insurance coverage. One of the reasons that the typical American has so little understanding of his or her health insurance benefits is the lack of uniformity across plans. Not only does coverage change when a person switches jobs, but every family member may be in a plan with different benefits. By having standard cost-sharing requirements, over time most people will gain a much better understanding of coverage of and liability for medical care expenses.
Wage effects. If income-related cost sharing is made part of a universal health insurance program, might not employers that previously did not offer health insurance coverage react to this mandate by lowering workers' wages? A well-known economic principle posits that total worker compensation will equal the value of the worker's contribution to the firm's output. If this is the case, it could (and often is) argued that if firms are required to offer health insurance to their employees, firms will respond to this mandate by lowering wage rates or by laying off workers. It could then be argued that low-wage workers in such firms would not be made better off under a system of universal coverage.
There are two responses to this argument. First, there has been, thus far, no empirical support for this economic thesis. Studies that have attempted to find a trade-off between wages and health insurance benefits have been unable to do so. 30 This is not to say that such a trade-off does not exist; indeed, there is evidence in the literature to suggest such a trade-off between wage rates and firms' contributions to workers' compensation insurance. 31 No such evidence exists so far with regard to health insurance contributions.
The second point is that most firms already offer health insurance benefits; income-related cost sharing would improve equity among workers in such firms. More highly paid employees would, in effect, subsidize lowincome workers. Health care usage would be largely unrelated to income, but cost-sharing requirements would be proportional to it. Furthermore, high-wage workers would not be able to "escape" their liabilities because all firms would be subject to the same requirements.
Role of managed care organizations. Income-related cost sharing should apply only to the fee-for-service sector. Employers would continue to be encouraged to offer their employees health maintenance organization (HMO) coverage; those opting for the HMO would not be subject to income-related cost sharing. Any differences in the cost (be they positive or negative) between fee-for-service and HMO coverage would be the responsibility of the employee, in the form of higher or lower premiums. Likewise, public insurers could also encourage HMO use by varying the premium it charges the nonpoor for the HMO vis-à-vis the fee-for-service plan.
Fitting the standard preferred provider organization (PPO) modelwhich essentially is a fee-for-service system with discounts given by providers and financial incentives for enrollees-into a system of income-related cost sharing is more problematic. PPOs usually reduce or remove patient cost-sharing requirements. Thus, even if PPOs adopted income-related cost sharing, the actual cost-sharing percentages would be different than those in the rest of the fee-for-service sector. It therefore would be difficult to come up with a system to calculate appropriate tax credits at year-end.
From a public policy standpoint, however, there may not be a strong need to explicitly include this standard PPO option, because most recent studies have found that PPOs have not successfully controlled health care costs. 32 Even worse, some researchers have concluded that they have actually increased utilization and costs. 33 PPO enrollees use more services because they face lower cost-sharing requirements. In theory, this could be overcome by other mechanisms employed by PPOs to reduce service usage (for example, choosing cost-efficient providers), but up until now this INCOME-RELATED COST SHARING 35 apparently has not been effective enough.
A preferable option, which preserves the patient's freedom to choose providers, is the "point-of-service" or "open-ended" HMO. Point-of-service HMOs are capitated, but they allow enrollees to use providers outside of the network. They are also the fastest-growing type of alternative delivery system. Whereas less than one-half of 1 percent of employees were members of such a plan in 1989, 5 percent were enrolled in such plans in 1990. 34 Point-of-service plans could easily be incorporated into a system of income-related cost sharing. Any cost-sharing liabilities that are accrued could be made subject to the same deductible and out-of-pocket maximums as in the fee-for-service sector. To the extent that point-of-service plans control utilization, they could offer premium levels that would be very competitive with traditional HMOs and perhaps much cheaper than feefor-service plans.
Administrative burden. Wouldn't income-related cost sharing increase the current administrative burden faced by employers, health insurance plans, and patients? Actually, it should lessen the amount of administrative work on almost everyone's part. 35 From the employer's standpoint, a firm would offer only one fee-for-service plan, whereas now a firm may offer multiple indemnity and PPO plans. This would reduce the administrative burden placed on a firm's benefits office. Calculating enrollee liabilities also would be relatively straightforward. Perhaps the easiest method would be to assign each employee his or her particular cost-sharing requirements at the beginning of the year, based on the employee's salary at that time. Although each employee would have different deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums, third parties would face much less additional paperwork than they do now. Each employee's expenses would simply be compared against personal (that is, wage-related), as opposed to firmwide, sharing requirements to determine the appropriate reimbursements. The only specific problem mentioned by the firms we interviewed was a minor one concerning rounding-that is, whether deductibles and maximums should be rounded up or down to the nearest dollar.
There is a legitimate fear, however, that small employers would be unduly burdened. These firms already pay higher health insurance premiums for a defined set of benefits, in part because the fixed cost of administering their plans is spread over fewer employees. It could be argued that income-related cost sharing would aggravate this situation. Under a universal health insurance plan, in which all employers are required to provide coverage to their employees, one way to reduce this burden would be to give employers the option of signing up for a publicly sponsored plan. Firms that do not wish to offer their own health insurance plan can pay a payroll tax so that their employees are covered by the public plan. The amount of this tax would vary with firm size and could be kept at a level no higher than larger employers pay in tax revenues to cover private health insurance. The additional administrative effort on the part of public insurers also would be minimal. As proposed above, many of the people enrolled in the public plan would not face any cost-sharing requirements during the year. Rather, any tax liabilities would be assessed when income taxes are filed or, for the self-employed, during their quarterly interim payments.
Finally, the administrative burden on the patient would be eased. Since cost-sharing requirements already would be related to income, there would be no need to allow for the deductibility of catastrophic medical expenses on income tax returns. Each enrollee's plan (whether private insurance or the public plan) would simply report, at year-end, total covered medical expenses claimed by the enrollee, as well as total out-of-pocket costs assessed. These figures would then be entered directly onto income tax returns; no other patient record keeping would be necessary.
Conclusions
We believe that a strong case can be made for incorporating incomerelated cost sharing into private and public health insurance plans. Incomerelated cost sharing is far more equitable than the current system of fixed deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums. Furthermore, it has been successfully implemented by a small but notable minority of firms. A number of administrative issues remain to be resolved. What we have tried to show here is that it is nevertheless possible to devise a reasonably straightforward system for relating cost-sharing requirements to income levels in both public and private insurance plans.
We are now at a critical juncture with respect to our nation's health care policy. It is becoming increasingly likely that the United States will move toward some form of universal health insurance coverage. However, keeping the current cost-sharing system will mean that even under a universal coverage scheme, poorer people will still bear an unfair economic burden. Serious consideration therefore should be given to tnaking incotne-related cost sharing a central component of any health insurance reform package.
